The Sala Mudhugal vs UOI judgment has been important in the Women issues context, as it has deal with the marriage, divorce, conversion etc., in the secular context.

When many intellectuals f India have been talking, discoursing, writing, discussing and debating about the rights of women, children etc., it is a wonder as to how and why they do not discuss about it. Perhaps, they might have forgotten or made to forget it purposely.

I request the readers kindly go through the decision and come out with arguments, views and discussion.

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PETITIONER:
SMT. SARLA MUDGAL, PRESIDENT, KALYANI " ORS.

 Vs.

RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA " ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/05/1995

BENCH:
KULDIP SINGH (J)
BENCH:
KULDIP SINGH (J)
SAHAI, R.M. (J)

CITATION:
 1995 AIR 1531    1995 SCC  (3) 635
 JT 1995 (4)   331   1995 SCALE  (3)286
ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:
        THE 10TH DAY OF MAY, 1995
Present:
    Hon"ble Mr. Justice Kuldip Singh
    Hon"ble Mr. Justice R.M. Sahai
Mr. D.N. Diwedi, Additional Solicitor General,
Mr. V.C. Mahajan, Mr. Shankar Ghosh, Mr. R.K. Garg, Sr.
Advs.,
Ms. S. Janani, Mr. P. Parmeswaran, Mr. R.P. Srivastava,
Ms. A. Subhashini, (Ms. Janki Ramachandran, Mr. K.J. John,)
Advs. (N.P.), Mr. Shakeel Ahmed Syed, Advs. with them for
the appearing parties.
       J U D G M E N T S/O R D E R
The following Judgments/Order of the Court were delivered:
Smt. Sarla Mudgal, President,
Kalyani and Ors.
          Versus.
Union of India " Ors.
(W.P.(C) No.347/90, W.P. (C) No.509/92 and W.P. (C)
No.424/92)
      J U D G M E N T
Kuldip Singh, J.
   

  “The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a
uniform civil code through-out the territory of India" is an
unequivocal mandate  under Article 44 of the Constitution of
India which  seeks to  introduce a  uniform personal law - a
decisive step towards national consolidation. Pandit Jawahar
Lal Nehru,  while defending  the introduction  of the  Hindu
Code Bill instead of a uniform civil code, in the Parliament
in 1954, said “I do not think that at the present moment the
time is  ripe in India for me to try to push it through". It
appears that even 41 years thereafter, the Rulers of the day
are not  in a  mood to retrieve Article  44 from  the cold
storage where  it is  lying since  1949. The  Governments  -
which have  come and  gone -  have so far failed to make any
effort towards "unified personal  law for all Indians". The
reasons are  too obvious  to be  stated. The utmost that has
been done  is to  codify the  Hindu law  in the  form of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.  The Hindu  Succession Act, 1956,
the Hindu  Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 and the Hindu
Adoptions and  Maintenance Act, 1956 which have replaced the
traditional Hindu  law based on different schools of thought
and scriptural laws into  one unified code. When more than
80% of the citizens  have already  been brought  under  the
codified personal  law there  is no justification whatsoever
to keep  in abeyance, any more, the introduction of “uniform
civil code" for all citizens in the territory of India.
     The questions for our consideration are whether a Hindu
husband, married  under Hindu  law, by embracing Islam, can
solemnise second  marriage? Whether  such a marriage without
having the  first marriage  dissolved under  law, would be a
valid marriage qua the first wife who continue to be Hindu?
Whether the  apostate husband would be quilty of the offence
under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)?
     These are four  petitions  under Article  32  of  the
Constitution of  India. There  are two petitioners in Writ
Petition 1079/89. Petitioner 1 is the President of “KALYANI"
- a  registered society  - which  is an organisation working
for the  welfare of  needy-families and  women in  distress.
Petitioner 2, Meena Mathur was married to Jitender Mathur on
February 27,  1978. Three children (two sons and a daughter)
were born out of the wed-lock. In early 1988, the petitioner
was shocked  to learn that her husband had solemnised second
marriage with  one Sunita Narula @ Fathima. The marriage was
solemnised after  they converted  themselves  to  Islam  and
adopted  Muslim   religion.  According to  the  petitioner,
conversion of  her husband to Islam was only for the purpose
of marrying  Sunita  and  circumventing  the  provisions  of
Section  494,  IPC.  Jitender  Mathur  asserts that  having
embraced Islam,  he can  have four wives irrespective of the
fact that his first wife continues to be Hindu.
     Rather  interestingly   Sunita  alias  Fathima  is  the
petitioner in  Writ Petition  347 of 1990. She contends that
she along  with Jitender  Mathur who  was earlier married to
Meena Mathur  embraced Islam  and thereafter  got married. A
son was  born to her. She further states that after marrying
her, Jitender  Prasad, under  the  influence  of  her  first
Hindu-wife, gave  an undertaking  on April  28, 1988 that he
had reverted back to Hinduism and had agreed to maintain his
first wife  and three  children. Her  grievance is  that she
continues to  be Muslim, not being maintained by her husband
and has no protection under either of the personal laws.
     Geeta Rani, petitioner in Writ Petition 424 of 1992 was
married  to  Pradeep  Kumar  according to  Hindu  rites  on
November 13,  1988. It is alleged  in the petition that her
husband used to maltreat her and on one occasion gave her so
much beating that her jaw bone was broken. In December 1991,
the petitioner learnt that  Pradeep Kumar ran away with one
Deepa and  after conversion  to Islam  married her.  It  is
stated that the conversion to Islam was only for the purpose
of facilitating the second marriage.
     Sushmita Ghosh  is  another  unfortunate  lady  who  is
petitioner in  Civil Writ  Petition 509  of  1992.  She  was
married to  G.C. Ghosh according to  Hindu rites on May 10,
1984. On  April 20,  1992, the husband told  her that he no
longer wanted  to live with her and as such she should agree
to divorce by mutual consent. The petitioner was shocked and
prayed that  she was  her legally  wedded wife and wanted to
live with  him and  as such  the question of divorce did not
arise. The  husband finally  told the petitioner that he had
embraced Islam and would soon marry one Vinita Gupta. He had
obtained a  certificate dated  June 17,  1992 from  the Qazi
indicating that he had embraced Islam. In the writ petition,
the petitioner has  further  prayed  that  her  husband  be
restrained from  entering into second marriage  with Vinita
Gupta.
     Marriage  is  the very  foundation  of  the  civilised
society. The  relation once  formed, the  law steps  in  and
binds the  parties to  various obligations  and  liabilities
thereunder. Marriage is an institution in the maintenance of
which the  public at  large is deeply interested. It is the
foundation of  the family and in turn of the society without
which no civilisation can exist.
     Till the  time we achieve the goal - uniform civil code
for all  the citizens of India - there is an open inducement
to a  Hindu husband, who wants to enter into second marriage
while the  first marriage is subsisting, to become a Muslim.
Since monogamy is the law for  Hindus and  the Muslim  law
permits as many as four wives in India, errand Hindu husband
embraces Islam to circumvent the provisions of the Hindu law
and to escape from penal consequences.
     The doctrine  of indissolubility of marriage, under the
traditional Hindu  law, did  not recognise  that  conversion
would have  the  effect  of  dissolving  a  Hindu  marriage.
Conversion to  another religion  by one  or both  the  Hindu
spouses did not dissolve the marriage. It would be useful to
have a look at  some of the old cases on the subject. In Re
Ram Kumari  1891 Calcutta  246 where  a  Hindu wife  became
convert to  the Muslim faith and then married a Mohammedan,
it was held that  her earlier marriage with a Hindu husband
was not  dissolved by  her conversion. She was  charged and
convicted of  bigamy under  Section 494  of the  IPC. It was
held that  there was  no authority  under Hindu  law for the
proposition that  an apostate  is absolved  from  all  civil
obligations and  that so  far as  the matrimonial  bond  was
concerned, such view was contrary to the spirit of the Hindu
law. The  Madras High  Court followed  Ram Kumari in Budansa
vs. Fatima  1914 IC 697. In Gul Mohammed v. Emperor AIR 1947
Nagpur 121  a Hindu  wife was fraudulently taken away by the
accused a Mohammedan who married her according to Muslim law
after  converting  her to  Islam.  It was  held  that  the
conversion of  the Hindu  wife to  Mohammedan faith  did not
ipso facto  dissolve the  marriage and she could not during
the life  time of  her former  husband enter  into  a  valid
contract of  marriage. Accordingly the accused was convicted
for adultery under Section 497 of the IPC.
     In Nandi  @ Zainab  vs. The Crown (ILR 1920 Lahore 440,
Nandi, the wife of the complainant, changed her religion and
became a  Mussalman and thereafter married a Mussalman named
Rukan Din. She was charged with an offence under Section 494
of the Indian Penal Code. It was held that the mere fact of
her conversion to Islam did not dissolve the marriage which
could only  be dissolved  by a decree of court. Emperor vs.
Mt. Ruri  AIR 1919 Lahore 389, was a case of Christian wife.
The Christian wife renounced Christianity and embraced Islam
and then  married a Mohomedan. It was held that according to
the Christian  marriage law, which was the law applicable to
the case, the first marriage was not dissolved and therefore
the subsequent marriage was bigamous.
     In India  there has  never been  a matrimonial  law  of
general application.  Apart from  statute law a marriage was
governed by  the personal  law of  the parties.  A  marriage
solemnised under  a  particular  statute  and  according  to
personal law  could not  be dissolved  according to  another
personal law,  simply because one of the parties had changed
his or her religion.
     In Sayeda Khatoon @ A.M. Obadiah vs. M. Obadiah 49 CWN
745, Lodge, J. speaking for the court held as under:
     “The parties  were originally Jews bound
     by  the   Jewish  personal   law…  The
     Plaintiff has  since been converted  to
     Islam  and   may  in  some  respects  be
     governed by  the  Mohammedan  Law..  The
     Defendant is   not  governed   by   the
     Mahommedan Law.. If this were an Islamic
     country, where  the Mahommedan  Law  was
     applied to all cases where one party was
     a Mahommedan, it might be that plaintiff
     would be  entitled  to  the  declaration
     prayed for. But this is not a Mahommedan
     country; and  the Mahommedan  Law is not
     the  Law of  the  Land..  Now  all  my
     opinion, is  it the  Law of  India, that
     when any  person is  converted to Islam
     the Mahommedan  Law shall be applicable
     to him in all his relationships?.. I can
     see no  reason why  the  Mahommedan  Law
     should be preferred to the Jewish Law in
     a  matrimonial dispute   between   a
     Mahommdan and  a Jew  particularly  when
     the relationship, viz.:  marriage,  was
     created under  the  Jewish  Law.. As  I
     stated in a previous  case there is no
     matrimonial law  of general  application
     in India. There  is  a  Hindu  Law  for
     Hindus, a    Mahommedan    Law   for
     Mahommedans,   a Christian   Law   for
     Christians, and  a Jewish Law for Jews.
     There  is no  general  matrimonial  law
     regarding mixed marriages other than the
     statute law,  and there is no suggestion
     that the  statute law  is applicable  in
     the present  case.. It  may  be  that  a
     marriage solemnised  according to Jewish
     rites may be dissolved  by  the  proper
     authority under  Jewish Law  when one of
     the parties  renounces the Jewish Faith.
     It may  be that  a  marriage  solemnised
     according to   Jesish  rites   may   be
     dissolved by  the proper authority under
     Jewish  Law  when one  of  the  parties
     renounces the  Jewish Faith.  It may  be
     that a  marriage solemnised according to
     Mahommedan   Law  may   be   dissolved
     according to the Mahommedan Law when one
     of  the   parties  ceases   to   be   a
     Mahommedan. But  I can find no authority
     for the  view that a marriage solemnized
     according to  one personal  law  can  be
     dissolved according  to another personal
     law  simply   because  one  of  the  two
     parties   has   changed   his   or   her
     religion."
Sayeda Khatoon"s case was followed with approval by Blagden,
J. of  the Bombay  High Court  in Robasa Khanum vs. Khodadad
Bomanji Irani 1946 Bombay Law Reporter 864. In this case the
parties were  married according to Zoroastrian law. The wife
became Muslim  whereas the  husband declined  to do  so. The
wife claimed  that her marriage stood dissolved because of
her conversion to Islam.  The learned Judge dismissed  the
suit. It would be useful to quote the following observations
from the judgment:
     “We have, therefore,  this  position  -
     British India  as a  whole,  is  neither
     governed  by  Hindu,  Mahommedan, Sikh,
     Parsi, Christian, Jewish or  any other
     law  except   a  law  imposed  by Great
     Britain under  which Hindus, Mahomedans,
     Sikhs, Parsis,  and  all  others, enjoy
     equal rights  and the  utmost  possible
     freedom   of    religious   observance,
     consistent in every case with the rights
     of other  people. I  have to decide this
     case according  to the law as it is, and
     there seems,  in principle,  no adequate
     ground for  holding that  in  this  case
     Mahomedan law  is applicable  to a  non-
     Mahomedan..  Do   then  the  authorities
     compel me to hold that one spouse can by
     changing his  or her  religious opinions
     (or purporting  to do  so) force  his or
     her newly acquired personal  law on  a
     party to  whom it is entirely alien and
     who does  not want  it? In  the name  of
     justice, equity and good conscience, or,
     in  more simple language,  of  common
     sense, why  should this  be possible? If
     there were  no authority  on the point I
     (personally) should have thought that so
     monstrous an  absurdity carried  its own
     refutation with  it, so  extravagant are
     the results  that follow from it. For it
     is not only the question of divorce that
     the plaintiff"s  contention affects.  If
     it  is   correct, it   follows  that  a
     Christian husband can embrace Islam and,
     the next moment, three additional wives,
     without even the consent of the original
     wife."
Against the  judgment of  Blagden, J.  appeal was heard by a
Division  Bench  consisting  of  Sir  Leonard  Stone,  Chief
Justice and  Mr. Justice  Chagla (as  the learned Judge then
was). Chagla,  J. who spoke for the Bench posed the question
that  arose  for  determination  as  under:  “what  are  the
consequences of  the plaintiff"s  conversion to Islam?". The
Bench upheld  the judgment  of Blagden, J. and dismissed the
appeal. Chagla, J. Chagla, J. elaborating the legal position
held as under:-
     “We have here a Muslim wife according to
     whose personal  law conversion to Islam,
     if the other spouse does not embrace the
     same religion,  automatically  dissolves
     the  marriage.  We  have  a  Zoroastrian
     husband according to whose personal law
     such conversion does not bring about the
     same  result.   The  Privy   Council  in
     Waghela  Rajsanji  v.  Shekh   Masludin
     expressed the  opinion that if there was
     no rule  of Indian  law which  could  be
     applied to  a particular  case, then  it
     should be decided by  equity  and  good
     conscience, and  they interpreted equity
     and good conscience to mean the rules of
     English  law   if found  applicable  to
     Indian society  and  circumstances.  And
     the same  view was  confirmed  by their
     Lordships of   the  Privy   Council  in
     Muhammad Raza  v. Abbas  Bandi Bibi. But
     there is  no rule of English  law which
     can be  made applicable  to a  suit  for
     divorce by  a Muslim  wife  against  her
     Zoroastrian  husband.  The  English  law
     only  deals   and can  only  deal  with
     Christian marriages and with grounds for
     dissolving   a    Christian    marriage.
     Therefore we  must decided  according to
     justice and  right, or  equity and  good
     conscience    independently    of   any
     provisions of  the English  law. We must
     do  substantial   justice between   the
     parties and  in doing  so hope  that  we
     have  vindicated the   principles   of
     justice and  right or  equity  and  good
     conscience… It is impossible to accept
     the  contention  of  Mr.  Peerbhoy  that
     justice  and   right  requires  that  we
     should apply  Muslim law in dealing this
     case. It  is difficult  to see  why  the
     conversion of  one party  to a  marriage
     should necessarily  afford a  ground for
     its dissolution.  The bond  that keeps a
     man and  woman happy  in marriage is not
     exclusively the  bond of religion. There
     are  many  other ties  which  make  it
     possible for  a husband and wife to live
     happily  and  contentedly together.  It
     would indeed  be a startling proposition
     to lay  down that although two  persons
     may  want to  continue  to  live in  a
     married state  and disagree  as  to  the
     religion  they   should  profess, their
     marriage  must   be automatically
     dissolved. Mr.  Peerbhoy has  urged that
     it is rarely possible for two persons of
     different communities   to  be  happily
     united in wedlock. If conversion of one
     of the  spouses  leads  to  unhappiness,
     then  the  ground  for  dissolution  of
     marriage would not be the conversion but
     the resultant  unhappiness. Under Muslim
     law, apostasy from Islam of either party
     to a marriage operates as a complete and
     immediate dissolution  of the  marriage.
     But s.4  of the  Dissolution  of  Muslim
     Marriages Act  (VIII of  1939)  provides
     that the  renulciation  of  Islam by  a
     married Muslim  woman or  her conversion
     to a faith other than Islam shall not by
     itself operate to dissolve her marriage.
     This  is a  very  clear and  emphatic
     indication that  the Indian  legislature
     has departed  from;  the  rigor  of  the
     ancient Muslim  law and  has  taken  the
     more modern  view that  there is nothing
     to    prevent     a    happy    marriage
     notwithstanding the  fact that  the  two
     parties  to   it professed   different
     religious.. We  must also point out that
     the plaintiff  and  the  defendant  were
     married  according  to  the  Zoroastrian
     rites. They  entered into a solemn pact
     that the  marriage would  be  monogamous
     and could only be dissolved according to
     the tenets  of the Zoroastrian religion.
     It would be patently contrary to justice
     and right that one  party to  a  solemn
     pact should  be allowed  to repudiate it
     by  a   unilateral  act. It  would  be
     tantamount to  permitting the  wife  to
     force  a divorce  upon her   husband
     although he may not want it and although
     the marriage  vows which  both  of  them
     have taken would not permit it. We might
     also point out that the Shariat Act (Act
     XXVI of  1937) provides that the rule of
     decision in the various cases enumerated
     in  s.2   which  includes marriage  and
     dissolution of  marriage  shall  be  the
     Muslim  personal law  only  where  the
     parties are Muslims; it does not provide
     that the Muslim personal law shall apply
     when  only  one  of  the  parties is  a
     Muslim." (the  single Judge judgment and
     the Division Bench judgment are reported
     in 1946 Bombay Law Reporter 864)
     In Andal  Vaidyanathan  vs.  Abdul  Allam Vaidya 1946
Madras, a  Division Bench  of the  High Court dealing with a
marriage under the Special Marriage Act 1872 held:
     “The Special  Marriage Act  clearly only
     contemplates  monogamy   and  a   person
     married under the Act cannot escape from
     its provisions  by merely changing  his
     religion. Such  a person  commits bigamy
     if he  marries again during the lifetime
     of his  spouse, and  it matters not what
     religion he professes at the time of the
     second marriage. Section 17 provides the
     only means  for  the  dissolution of  a
     marriage  or   a  declaration   of   its
     nullity.
   Consequently,  where  two  persons
     married  under   the  Act  subsequently
     become converted  to Islam, the marriage
     can  only  be   dissolved   under   the
     provisions of  the Divorce  Act and  the
     same would  apply even  if only  one  of
     them becomes  converted to Islam. Such a
     marriage  is   not  a  marriage  in  the
     Mahomoden sense  which can  be dissolved
     in a Mahomedan manner. It is a statutory
     marriage and  can only  be dissolved  in
     accordance with  the Statute:  ("41)  28
     A.I.R.1941 Cal.  582 and  (1917) 1  K.B.
     634, Rel. on; ("35) 22 A.I.R. 1935 Bom.
     8 and 18 Cal. 264, Disting."
     It is, thus, obvious from the catena of case-low that a
marriage celebrated  under a  particular personal law cannot
be dissolved  by the  application of another personal law to
which one  of the  spouses converts and the other refuses to
do so. Where a  marriage takes  place under  Hindu Law  the
parties acquire  a status and certain rights by the marriage
itself under the law governing the Hindu Marriage and if one
of the parties is  allowed  to  dissolve  the marriage  by
adopting  and enforcing  a  new  personal  law,  it  would
tantamount to  destroying the  existing rights of the other
spouse who  continues to  be Hindu. We, therefore, hold that
under the  Hindu Personal  Law as  it existed  prior to  its
codification in  1955, a Hindu marriage continued to subsist
even after  one of the spouses converted to Islam. There was
no automatic dissolution of the marriage.
     The position has not changed after coming into force of
the Hindu  Marriage Act, 1955 (the Act) rather it has become
worse for  the apostate.  The Act  applies  to  Hindus  by
religion in  any of  its  forms  or  developments.  It also
applies to Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs. It has no application
to Muslims,  Christians and Parsees. Section 4 of the Act is
as under:
     “Overriding  effect   of  Act.  save  as
     otherwise expressly  provided  in  this
     Act,-
     (a)  any text, rule or interpretation of
     Hindu law or any custom or usage as part
     of that  law in force immediately before
     the commencement of this Act shall cease
     to  have  effect  with  respect  to  any
     matter for  which provision  is made  in
     this Act;
     (b)  any other  law in force immediately
     before  the  commencement of  this  Act
     shall cease  to have effect in so far as
     it  is  inconsistent  with  any  of  the
     provisions contained in this Act."
     A marriage  solemnised, whether  before  or  after  the
commencement of  the Act,  can only be dissolved by a decree
of divorce on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 13 of
the Act.  One of  the grounds  under Section  13 (i) (ii) is
that “the other party has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion
to another  religion". Sections  11 and  15 of the Act is as
under:-
     “Void    marriages:-     Any    marriage
     solemnized  after the  commencement  of
     this Act shall be null and void and may,
     on a  petition presented by either party
     thereto against  the other  party, be so
     declared by  a decree  of nullity if it
     contravenes any  one of  the  conditions
     specified in  clauses (i),  (iv) and (v)
     of Section 5."
     “Divorced persons when may marry again.-
     When a  marriage has been dissolved by a
     decree of divorce and either there is no
     right of  appeal against  the decree or,
     of there  is such a right of appeal the
     time for  appealing has  expired without
     an appeal having been  presented or  an
     appeal has  been presented  but has been
     dismissed, it shall be lawful for either
     party to the marriage to marry again."
     It is  obvious from  the various  provisions of the Act
that the  modern Hindu Law strictly  enforces monogamy.  A
marriage performed  under the Act cannot be dissolved except
on the grounds available  under section  13 of  the Act. In
that situation parties who  have  solemnised  the  marriage
under the  Act remain married even when the husband embraces
Islam in  pursuit of  other wife.  A second  marriage by  an
apostate under the shelter  of conversion  to Islam  would
nevertheless be a marriage in violation of the provisions of
the Act  by which  he would  be continuing to be governed so
far as his first marriage under the Act is concerned despite
his conversion to Islam. The second marriage of an apostate
would, therefore,  be illegal  marriage  qua  his  wife  who
married him under the Act and continues to be Hindu. Between
the apostate  and his  Hindu wife  the second marriage is in
violation of  the provisions of the Act and as such would be
nonest. Section 494 Indian Penal Code is as under:-
     “Marrying again during lifetime   of
     husband  or   wife.  Whoever,  having  a
     husband or  wife living,  marries in any
     case in  which such  marriage is void by
     reason of its taking  place during  the
     life of  such husband  or wife, shall be
     punished  with  imprisonment  of  either
     description for  a term which may extend
     to seven years, and shall also be liable
     to fine.
     The necessary  ingredients  of  the  Section  are:  (1)
having a  husband or  wife living;  (2) marries in any case;
(3) in which such  marriage is  void; (4)  by reason of its
taking place during the life of such husband or wife.
     It is  no doubt correct that the marriage solemnised by
a Hindu  husband after embracing Islam may not be strictly a
void marriage under the Act because he is no longer a Hindu,
but the  fact remains  that the  said marriage would be  in
violation of the Act which strictly professes monogamy.
     The expression  “void" for  the purpose  of the Act has
been defined  under Section  11 of the Act. It has a limited
meaning  within  the  scope  of  the  definition  under  the
Section. On  the  other  hand  the  same  expression  has  a
different purpose under Section 494, IPC and has to be given
meaningful interpretation.
     The expression  “void" under  section 494, IPC has been
used in the wider sense. A marriage which is in violation of
any provisions of  law  would be  void  in  terms  of  the
expression used under Section 494, IPC.
     A Hindu  marriage solemnised  under the Act can only be
dissolved on  any of  the grounds  specified under  the Act.
Till the  time a  Hindu marriage  is dissolved under the Act
none of the spouses can contract second marriage. Conversion
to Islam  and marrying again would not, by itself, dissolve
the Hindu  marriage under  the Act. The second marriage by a
convert would  therefore be  in violation  of the Act and as
such void  in terms of Section 494, IPC. Any act which is in
violation of mandatory provisions of law is per-se void.
     The real reason for the voidness of the second marriage
is the subsisting  of the  first  marriage  which  is  not
dissolved even by the conversion of the husband. It would be
giving a  go-bye to  the substance  of the matter and acting
against the  spirit of the Statute if the second marriage of
the convert is held to be legal.
     We also  agree with  the law laid down by Chagla, J. in
Robasa Khanum  vs. Khodabad Irani"s case (supra) wherein the
learned Judge  has held  that the  conduct of  a spouse  who
converts to  Islam has to be judged on the basis of the rule
of justice  and right  or  equity  and good  conscience.  A
matrimonial dispute  between a convert to  Islam and his or
her non-Muslim spouse is obviously not a dispute “where the
parties are Muslims" and, therefore, the rule of decision in
such a case was  or is  not  required to  be the  “Muslim
Personal Law". In such  cases the  Court shall  act and the
Judge shall  decide according  to justice,  equity and good
conscience. The  second marriage  of a Hindu husband  after
embracing Islam  being violative of justice, equity and good
conscience would be void on that ground also and attract the
provisions of Section 494, IPC.
     Looked from  another angle,  the second  marriage of an
apostate-husband would be in  violation  of  the  rules  of
natural justice.  Assuming that  a Hindu husband has a right
to embrace  Islam as his religion, he has no right under the
Act to marry again  without getting  his marriage under the
Act dissolved. The second marriage after conversion to Islam
would, thus, be in violation of the rules of natural justice
and as such would be void.
     The interpretation  we have  given to  Section 494  IPC
would advance  the interest of justice. It is necessary that
there should  be harmony between the two systems of law just
as there  should be  harmony between  the  two communities.
Result of  the interpretation, we have given to Section 494
IPC, would  be that  the Hindu Law on the one hand and the
Muslim Law  on the  other hand would operate  within  their
respective ambits  without trespassing on the personal laws
of each  other. Since  it is  not the object of Islam nor is
the intention  of the  enlighten Muslim  community that  the
Hindu husbands should be encouraged to become Muslims merely
for the  purpose of  evading  their  own  personal  laws  by
marrying again,  the courts  can be  persuaded to  adopt  a
construction of  the laws  resulting in  denying  the  Hindu
husband converted  to Islam the right to marry again without
having his  existing marriage  dissolved in  accordance with
law.
All the four ingredients of Section 494 IPC are satisfied in
the case  of a Hindu husband who marries for the second time
after conversion  to Islam. He has a wife living, he marries
again. The  said marriage  is void  by reason  of its taking
place during the life of the first wife.
     We, therefore, hold that the second marriage of a Hindu
husband after  his conversion to Islam is a void marriage in
terms of Section 494 IPC.
     We may  at this stage notice the Privy Council judgment
in Attorney  General Ceylon  vs. Reid (1965 Al. E.R. 812). A
Christian lady was married according to the Christian rites.
Years later  she embraced  Islamic faith  and got married by
the Registrar  of Muslim  Marriages at Colombo according to
the statutory  formalities prescribed for a Muslim marriage.
The husband  was charged and convicted by the Supreme Court,
Ceylon of the offence of bigamy under the Ceylon Penal Code.
In an  appeal before  the Privy  Council, the respondent was
absolved from  the offence  of bigamy. It was held by Privy
Council as under :-
     “In  their   Lordship"s  view,  in  such
     countries there  must  be  an  inherent
     right in the inhabitants domiciled there
     to change their religion and  personal
     law  and so  to  contract   a valid
     polygamous marriage if recognised by the
     laws of  the country  notwithstanding an
     earlier marriage. It such inherent right
     is to  be abrogated,  it must be done by
     statute."
     Despite  there   being  an  inherent  right  to  change
religion the  applicability of Penal laws would depend upon
the two  personal laws governing the marriage. The decision
of Privy  Council was on the facts of the case, specially in
the background of the two personal laws operating in Ceylon.
Reid"s case  is, thus, of no  help to us in  the facts and
legal background of the present cases.
     Coming back to the question “uniform civil code" we may
refer to the earlier judgments of this Court on the subject.
A Constitution Bench of  this Court  speaking through Chief
Justice Y.V.  Chandrachud in  Mohd. Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano
Begum AIR 1985 SC 945 held as under:
     “It is  also a  matter  of  regret  that
     Article  44   of  our  Constitution  has
     remained a dead letter. It provides that
     “The State shall endeavour to secure for
     the  citizens   a uniform   civil  code
     throughout  the   territory  of  India".
     There is  no evidence  of any  official
     activity for framing a common civil code
     for the  country. A belief seems to have
     gained ground  that it is for the Muslim
     community to  take a  lead in the matter
     of reforms  of  their  personal  law.  A
     common Civil Code will help the cause of
     national integration    by    removing
     disparate loyalties  to laws  which have
     conflicting ideologies.  No community is
     likely  to   bell the   cat  by  making
     gratuitous concessions on this issue. It
     is the  State which  is charged with the
     duty of  securing a  uniform civil  code
     for the  citizens of  the country  and,
     unquestionably; it  has the  legislative
     competence to  do so.  A counsel  in the
     case whispered,  somewhat audibly,  that
     legislative competence is one thing, the
     political courage to use that competence
     is  quite another.  We  understand  the
     difficulties   involved in   bringing
     persons   of    different  faiths   and
     persuasions on a common platform. But, a
     beginning has   to  be   made  is   the
     Constitution is  to  have any  meaning.
     Inevitably, the role of the reformer has
     to be  assumed by the courts because, it
     is beyond the  endurance of  sensitive
     minds to  allow injustice to be suffered
     when it  is so  palpable. But  piecemeal
     attempts of  courts to  bridge that  gap
     between personal  laws cannot  take  the
     place of a common Civil Code. Justice to
     all is  a far  more satisfactory  way of
     dispensing  justice  than justice  from
     case to case."
In Ms. Jordan Diengdeh  vs. S.S.  Chopra AIR 1985 SC 935 O.
Chinnappa Reddy,  J. speaking  for the Court referred to the
observations of  Chandrachud, CJ  in Shah  Bano Begum"s case
and observed as under:
     “It  was  just  the  other  day  that  a
     Constitution Bench  of this Court had to
     emphasise the  urgency of infusing life
     into Art. 44 of  the Constitution which
     provides that “The State shall endeavour
     to secure for the  citizens  a  uniform
     civil code  throughout the  territory of
     India." The  present case is yet another
     which focuses  .. on  the immediate  and
     compulsive  need  for  a  uniform civil
     code. The totally unsatisfactory state
     of affairs  consequent on the lack of a
     uniform civil  code is  exposed  by  the
     facts  of  the  present case.  Before
     mentioning the  facts of  the  case,  we
     might as  well refer to the observations
     of Chandrachud,  CJ in  the recent  case
     decided by the Constitution Bench (Mohd.
     Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano Begum)."
One wonders  how long will it take for the Government of the
day  to   implement  the  mandate  of  the  framers  of  the
Constitution under  Article 44 of the Constitution of India.
The traditional  Hindu law  - personal law of the Hindus -
governing inheritance, succession and marriage was given go-
bye as back as  1955-56 by  codifying the same. There is no
justification  whatsoever   in delaying   indefinitely  the
introduction of a uniform personal law in the country.
     Article 44  is based  on the  concept that  there is no
necessary connection  between religion and personal law in a
civilised society.  Article 25 guarantees religious freedom
whereas Article  44 seeks  to divest  religion from  social
relations and  personal law.  Marriage, succession  and like
matters of  a secular character cannot be brought within the
guarantee enshrined  under  Articles  25,  26  and  27.  The
personal law  of the  Hindus, such  as relating to marriage,
succession and the like  have all  a sacramental origin, in
the same  manner as  in the  case  of  the  Muslims  or  the
Christians. The  Hindus alongwith Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains
have forsaken  their sentiments in the cause of the national
unity and  integration, some  other communities  would not,
though the  Constitution  enjoins  the establishment  of  a
“common civil Code" for the whole of India.
     It has  been judicially  acclaimed in the United States
of America  that the  practice of  Polygamy is injurious to
“public morals",  even though  some  religion  may  make  it
obligatory  or desirable  for its  followers.  It  can  be
superseded by  the State  just as  it can  prohibit  human
sacrifice or  the practice  of “Suttee"  in the  interest of
public order.  Bigamous marriage  has been  made  punishable
amongst Christians  by Act  (XV of 1872), Parsis by Act (III
of 1936)  and Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains by Act (XXV
of 1955).
     Political history of India shows that during the Muslim
regime, justice  was administered  by the  Qazis  who  would
obviously apply  the Muslim  Scriptural law  to Muslims, but
there was no similar assurance so far litigations concerning
Hindus was  concerned. The  system, more  or less, continued
during the  time of  the East India Company, until 1772 when
Warren Hastings  made Regulations  for the administration of
civil justice   for the   native   population,   without
discrimination between  Hindus  and  Mahomedans.  The 1772
Regulations followed  by the  Regulations of 1781 whereunder
it was prescribed that  either community was to be governed
by its "personal" law in matters  relating to inheritance,
marriage, religious  usage and institutions. So  far as the
criminal  justice   was  concerned   the  British  gradually
superseded the Muslim law  in 1832 and criminal justice was
governed by the English common law. Finally the Indian Penal
Code was  enacted  in  1860.  This  broad  policy  continued
throughout the British regime until independence  and  the
territory of  India was  partitioned by  the British  Rulers
into  two  States  on  the  basis  of  religion.  Those  who
preferred to remain in India after the partition, fully knew
that the  Indian leaders  did not  believe in  two-nation or
three-nation theory  and that  in the  Indian Republic there
was to be only one Nation - Indian nation - and no community
could claim  to remain a separate  entity on  the basis  of
religion. It  would  be  necessary  to emphasise  that  the
respective personal  laws were permitted by  the British to
govern the  matters relating  to inheritance, marriages etc.
only  under   the  Regulations of  1781  framed  by  Warren
Hastings.  The Legislation  - not  religion  -  being  the
authority under  which personal law was permitted to operate
and  is   continuing   to   operate,   the   same   can   be
superseded/supplemented by introducing a uniform civil code.
In this  view of  the matter  no community  can  oppose  the
introduction of  uniform civil code for all the citizens in
the territory of India.
     The Successive  Governments till-date  have been wholly
re-miss in  their duty of implementing  the  constitutional
mandate under Article 44 of the Constitution of India.
     We, therefore,  request the Government of India through
the Prime  Minister of the country  to have a fresh look at
Article 44  of the  Constitution of  India and “endeavour to
secure for  the citizens  a uniform  civil code throught the
territory of India".
     We further  direct  the  Government  of  India  through
Secretary, Ministry  of Law and Justice to file an affidavit
of a  responsible officer  in this  Court  in  August, 1996
indicating therein  the steps taken and efforts made, by the
Government of India, towards securing a “uniform civil code"
for the  citizens of India. Sahai, J. in his short and crisp
supporting opinion  has suggested some of the measures which
can be undertaken by the Government in this respect.
     Answering the questions posed by us in the beginning of
the judgment,  we hold that the second marriage of a Hindu-
husband after  conversion to Islam, without having his first
marriage dissolved  under law, would be invalid. The second
marriage would be void in terms of the provisions of Section
494 IPC  and the  apostate-husband would  be guilty  of  the
offence under Section 494 IPC.
     The question  of law having been answered we dispose of
the writ  petitions. The  petitioners may seek any relief by
invoking any  remedy which  may be  available to  them as  a
result of this judgment or otherwise. No costs.
Smt. Sarla Mudgal, President Kalyani " Ors. etc. etc.
     Vs.
Union of India " Ors.
      J U D G M E N T
R.M. SAHAI, J.
     Considering senstivity  of the  issue and magnitude of
the problem, both on the desirability of a uniform or common
civil code  and its feasibility, it appears necessary to add
a few  words to  the social necessity projected in the order
proposed by  esteemed Brother Kuldip Singh, J. more to focus
on the urgency of such a legislation and to emphasise that I
entirely agree with the thought provoking reasons which have
been brought forth by him in his order clearly and lucidly.
 

    The pattern  of debate,  even today, is the same as was
voiced forcefully  by the  members of the minority community
in the Constituent Assembly. If, `the non-implementation of
the provisions contained in  Article 44  amounts  to  grave
failure of  Indian democracy"  represents one  side  of  the
picture,  then  the  other   side  claims   that,  `Logical
probability  appears   to  be  that  the  code would  cause
dissatisfaction and  disintegration than  serve as  a common
umbrella to promote homogeneity and national solidarity".
     When Constitution was framed  with secularism  as  its
ideal and  goal, the  consensus and  conviction to  be one,
socially,  found   its expression  in Article  44  of  the
Constitution. But religious freedom, the basic foundation of
secularism, was  guaranteed by Articles 25  to  28  of  the
Constitution.  Article  25  is   very widely  worded.  It
guarantees all persons, not  only freedom of conscience but
the right  to profess, practice and propagate religion. What
is religion?  Any faith  or belief.  The Court has expanded
religious liberty  in its  various phases  guaranteed by the
Constitution and  extended it to practices and even external
overt acts  of the  individual. Religion  is more  than mere
matter of faith. The Constitution by guaranteeing freedom of
conscience ensured  inner aspects  of religious  belief. And
external expression  of it  were protected  by guaranteeing
right to  freely, practice  and propagate  religion. Reading
and reciting  holy scriptures, for  instance, Ramayana  or
Quran or  Bible or  Guru Granth  Sahib is  as much a part of
religion as offering food to deity by a Hindu or bathing the
idol or  dressing him  and going to a temple, mosque, church
or gurudwara.

     Marriage, inheritance,  divorce, conversion are as much
religious in  nature and  content as  any  other  belief  or
faith. Going  round the  fire seven rounds or giving consent
before Qazi  are as  much matter  of faith and conscience as
the worship itself. When a Hindu becomes convert by reciting
Kalma or  a Mulsim becomes Hindu by reciting certain Mantras
it is  a matter  of belief  and conscience.  Some  of  these
practices observed  by members of one religion may appear to
be excessive  and even violative of human rights to members
of another. But these are matters of faith. Reason and logic
have little  role to  play. The sentiments and emotions have
to be cooled and tempered by sincere effort. But today there
is no  Raja Ram  Mohan Rai  who single handed brought about
that atmoophere  which paved the way for Sati abolition. Nor
is a  statesman of  the stature of Pt. Nehru who could pilot
through, successfully, the Hindu  Succession Act  and Hindu
Marriage Act  revolutionising the  customary Hindu  Law. The
desirability of  uniform Code  can hardly be doubted. But it
can concretize only when social climate is properly built up
by elite  of the  society,  statesmen  amongst leaders  who
instead of  gaining personal  mileage rise  above and awaken
the masses to accept the change.
     The problem  with which  these appeals are concerned is
that many Hindus have changed their religion and have become
convert  to   Islam  only   for  purposes  of  escaping  the
consequences of  bigamy. For  instance, Jitendra  Mathur was
married to  Meena Mathur. He and another Hindu girl embraced
Islam. Obviously  because Muslim  Law permits  more than one
wife and  to the  extent of  four. But no religion  permits
deliberate distortions.  Much misapprehension prevails about
bigamy in  Islam. To check the misuse many Islamic countries
have codified  the personal  Law, `Wherein  the practice  of
polygamy has  been either  totally  prohibited or  severely
restricted. (Syria,  Tunisia, Morocco, Pakistan, Iran,  the
Islamic Republics of the Soviet Union are some of the Muslim
countries to  be remembered  in this context". But ours is a
Secular Democratic Republic. Freedom of religion is the core
of our culture. Even  the slightest  deviation  shakes  the
social fibre.  `But religious  practices, violative of human
rights and dignity and sacerdotal suffocation of essentially
civil  and   material  freedoms,   are not   autonomy  but
oppression". Therefore,  a unified  code is  imperative both
for protection of the oppressed and  promotion of national
unity and  solidarity. But  the  first step  should  be  to
rationalise the  personal law  of the  minorities to develop
religious and  cultural amity. The Government would be well
advised to  entrust the responsibility to the Law Commission
which may in consultation with Minorities Commission examine
the matter  and bring about the comprehensive legislation in
keeping with modern day concept of human rights for women.

     The  Government   may  also   consider  feasibility  of
appointing a  Committee to enact Conversion of Religion Act,
immediately, to  check the  abuse of religion by any person.
The law  may provide  that every  citizen  who changes  his
religion cannot  marry another wife unless  he divorces his
first wife. The provision should be made applicable to every
person whether he is a Hindu or a Muslim or a Christian or a
Sikh or  a Jain  or  a Budh.  Provision  may  be  made  for
maintenance and  succession etc.  also to  avoid  clash  of
interest after death.
     This would  go a long way to solve the problem and pave
the way for a unified civil code.
Smt. Sarla Mudgal, President

Kalyani and Ors.
     Vs.
Union of India " Ors.
(W.P. (C) No.347/90, W.P. (C) No.509/92
and W.P. (C) No.424/92).
         O R D E R
     For the reasons and conclusions reached in separate but
concurring judgments the Writ petitions are allowed in terms
of the answers to  the questions  posed in  the opinion  of
Kuldip Singh, J.

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